




























Center for Economic and Policy Research 
1611 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400 








External Public Debt and Conditionality.........................................................................................7 

















About the Author 
Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director and Luis Sandoval is a Research Assistant at the Center for 
Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank Patricia Kupfer, David Rosnick, and Dan Beeton for 
research assistance, and Dean Baker, Todd Tucker, Thomas Kruse, and Gretchen Gordon 
for valuable comments.
 Bolivia’s Challenges    1 
Executive Summary 
 
Bolivia’s new government took office in January 2006 with a strong mandate for economic reform, 
and with promises that such reform would both increase economic growth and benefit the poor. 
Nonetheless an electoral mandate for economic change does not necessarily translate into reform. 
There are various external pressures, from foreign governments (especially the United States), multi-
lateral lending institutions, and other sources that can influence policy. This paper looks at Bolivia’s 
potential vulnerability to pressures in conjunction with external public debt and debt relief, grants 
and foreign borrowing, and trade. 
 
The demand for new economic policies stems from a long-term economic failure: real GDP per 
capita in Bolivia is less today than it was 27 years ago (see Figures 1 and 2), and 64 percent of the 
country lives below the poverty line. Furthermore, Bolivia has completed numerous structural 
reforms (see Figure 3) that economists from multi-lateral lending institutions have recommended, 
and has operated under IMF agreements almost continuously for 20 years. In the IMF’s April 2005 
country report on Bolivia, the authors discuss the Bolivian “puzzle” – “that a country perceived as 
having one of the best structural reform records in Latin America experienced sluggish per capita 
growth, and made virtually no progress in reducing income-based poverty measures” (IMF 2005a, p. 
4). 
 
More than 70 percent of Bolivia’s $6.7 billion public debt is external, and most of this external debt 
(more than 90 percent) is owed to multilateral lending institutions (see Table 1). The IMF cancelled 
almost all of Bolivia’s debt to it this year and the World Bank is set to cancel $1.53 billion. The 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) holds $1.6 billion of Bolivia’s debt, and is also expected 
to cancel this debt, although this has not yet been decided.  
 
Net foreign borrowing by Bolivia has diminished in recent years, to $79.7 million or 0.9 percent of 
GDP in 2005 (See Table 4).  Concessional, low-interest foreign lending to Bolivia can be expected 
to be reduced in the near future, as the country’s per capita income level passes the maximum 
amount that allows for eligibility for such loans. 
 
Grants and donations from foreign countries comprise about $110 million, or 1.05 percent of GDP, 
in the government’s budget for 2006 (See Table 3).   
 
With regard to debt cancellation, loans, and aid flows, it would be politically difficult to treat Bolivia 
differently from other countries in the same category. The IDB cancellation would be expected to 
apply to the four Latin American HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) debtors, under which 
Bolivia has received prior debt cancellation. Bolivia has passed the “completion point” for the 
Enhanced HIPC initiative, meeting a set of quantitative financial benchmarks and structural reform 
criteria under the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The IMF and World Bank 
decided that “virtually all quantitative targets had been met” (IMF and IDA 2001, p. 21) under the 
PRGF. A “long track record of sound macroeconomic policies and substantial structural 
adjustment” (IMF and IDA 2001, p. 4) according to the IMF and World Bank, had enabled Bolivia 
to reach the completion point under the original HIPC initiative. 
 
Since meeting these conditions Bolivia’s macroeconomic performance – according to the criteria 
most important to the multilateral lenders – has improved considerably. In 2002 the government 
was running a public sector budget deficit of 8.8 percent of GDP; for 2005 it is 3.5 percent and the 
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IMF projects 3.0 percent for 2006 (IMF 2005b, p. 26). The country has also gone from a $324 
million (4.1 percent of GDP) current account deficit in 2002 to a $205 million (2.1% percent of 
GDP) surplus for 2005 (IMF 2005b, p. 30). So it would be very difficult to conceive of a 
performance-based reason to deny debt relief, loans, or grants to Bolivia. 
 
It would also be difficult to single out Bolivia with regard to trade preferences in the U.S. market. 
Although preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) 
are set to expire at the end of the year, they will very likely be extended. Even if Bolivia eventually 
loses these preferences because it does not sign a new Free Trade Agreement with the United States, 
this would affect less than two percent of the country’s exports. 
 
Another question with regard to external pressures regarding the new government’s economic 
policies is the future role of the IMF in Bolivia. Traditionally, the IMF has served as a “gatekeeper” 
for other sources of external financing, and therefore – together with its dominant stakeholder, the 
U.S. Treasury Department – has been able to exert considerable influence over economic policy. For 
a number of reasons discussed below, it seems unlikely that the IMF will play this role in Bolivia in 
the future. 
 
The new government is therefore in a relatively good position to choose policies that could 
accelerate growth and deliver on its promises to the poor. The May 2005 hydrocarbons law has 
substantially improved the fiscal situation of the government for the foreseeable future. Although 
the government does depend on some foreign financing for its operations, this dependence has been 
diminishing as the fiscal situation has improved and should fall considerably as the World Bank and 
IDB debt – accounting for about three-quarters of the country’s external public debt – are cancelled.  
 
One thing that the new government could do, as a precautionary measure and to help smooth the 
country’s transition to non-concessional and domestic borrowing, is to apply for a line of credit with 
the Venezuelan government. Venezuela’s lending from its surplus foreign exchange reserves to 
Argentina and Ecuador has been a very important source of financing for those countries, and will 
almost certainly be available to Bolivia should it become necessary. But by opening a line of credit in 
advance – one that it is not expected to draw upon in the foreseeable future – Bolivia can 
significantly reduce some risks of financial instability. For example, this pre-approved credit would 
reduce the risk of the kinds of runs on deposits that the country experienced in 2002 and 2004, as 
depositors would know that the country has access to an additional supply of foreign exchange 
reserves.  
 
Another move that could improve the government’s fiscal situation in the immediate future as well 
as for many years, would be to reverse the privatization of the country’s public pension system. As 
noted above, and also by the IMF (IMF 2005a, p. 17-18), this privatization has created very large, 
long-term transition costs, as the income from current payroll taxes is not available to pay current 
retirees. By returning to a “pay-as-you-go” system as the United States has, the government’s fiscal 
deficit could be substantially reduced. The potential deficit reduction from switching back to a 
traditional public defined-benefit system is large enough that this option is definitely worth 
considering. 
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Introduction 
 
On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales became the sixth Latin American president
1 to be elected after 
campaigning against the economic reforms of the last 25 years, or “neoliberalism” as they are 
commonly referred to in the region, and promising an alternative.
2  
Like Lula da Silva in Brazil, Morales won with an unprecedented electoral mandate – in his case 54 
percent of the vote, the highest for any elected president in Bolivia’s 20 years of democratic 
elections, and a record voter turnout. Furthermore, Morales’ party has a majority in the lower house 
of Congress and a possible working majority in the Senate. 
The need for new economic policies can be seen from the severe economic failure over the last 
quarter-century. As shown in Figure 1, Bolivia’s per capita income today remains below its level of 
1978.  Figure 2 shows Bolivia’s economic growth (per capita GDP) over the last 25 years, as 
compared with the 1960-1980 period; the same measures are also shown for the entire Latin 
American region. As can be seen from the graph, Bolivia’s per capita income has grown by less than 
2 percent over the past 25 years, as compared to 60 percent from 1960-1980. This is even worse 
than the region as a whole, which during the last 25 years also suffered its worst growth 
performance in the last century. Per capita GDP growth for the region was only 10 percent for 
1980-2005, as compared with 82 percent for 1960-1980 (Figure 2). 
Over the last 20 years, Bolivia has been operating continuously under International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) agreements (with the exception of an 8-month period).
3 Partly in accordance with these 
agreements with the Fund, which coordinated its policies in Bolivia with the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB)
4 – Bolivia has undertaken some of the most wide-ranging 
structural reforms in Latin America. Figure 3 shows Bolivia’s ranking according to a “Structural 
Reform Index” developed by Lora (2001).
5 It can be seen that for most of the past two decades, 
Bolivia has outperformed the region in implementing the recommended structural reforms. Indeed, 
in the IMF’s April 2005 country report on Bolivia, the authors discuss the Bolivian “puzzle” – “that 
a country perceived as having one of the best structural reform records in Latin America 
experienced sluggish per capita growth, and made virtually no progress in reducing income-based 
poverty measures” (IMF 2005a, p.4). 
                                                 
1 The others were Néstor Kirchner of Argentina (2003), Lula da Silva of Brazil (2002), Lucio Gutiérrez of Ecuador 
(2002), Tabaré Vázquez of Uruguay (2005), and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1998 and 2000). 
2 The second of “Ten Proposals to Change the Country,” by Movement Toward Socialism (MAS in Spanish), Evo 
Morales’ party, which also took a majority of the lower house and the presidency of the Senate, proposes a 
Constitutional Assembly to “uproot the exclusionary, discriminatory and colonial, neoliberal state, and design a new 
dignified, communitarian and productive state for all” (http://www.mas.org.bo/nueve.htm).  
3 June 2002 to April 2003. 
4 See, for example,  IMF (2005a, p. 11): “Over the last ten years, the Fund has collaborated extensively with the World 
Bank and IDB on fiscal and financial sector reforms as well as other structural reforms [in Bolivia]. With respect to 
financial sector reforms, the World Bank has generally taken the lead until recently. . . The Bank also took the lead in 
advising the authorities on capitalization (privatization).”  
5 The Structural Reform Index is based on five sub-indeces in the areas of trade, finance, taxation, labor and 
privatization for 19 countries of Latin America and the Carribean. 
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Bolivia is also the poorest country in South America, with a per capita income of $2,800, as 
compared to an average of $8,200 for Latin America and $42,000 for the United States (IMF 
2005d).
6 About 64 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.
7 There is no doubt that 
this majority voted for economic change in the hope that this would better their conditions. 
Nonetheless, an electoral mandate does not immediately translate into policy changes. In addition to 
conflicting economic, regional, ethnic,
8 and sectoral interests within the country, there are often 
external pressures that play a role in setting the parameters for economic and social change. In 
developing countries and in Latin America in particular, these pressures often come from 
multilateral lending institutions (the IMF, World Bank, IDB), international financial markets, or rich 
country governments. Access to foreign markets for exports can also be made conditional on the 
country adopting certain economic policies.  In Latin America, the United States government has 
historically been a very powerful influence in all of these arenas, and an important political force as 
well, especially vis-à-vis the smaller economies. Bolivia, with 8.7 million people, has an economy that 
is less than three-thousandths the size of the United States.
9 
Most of these influences and pressures – including trade, aid, debt, and other political pressures– are 
likely to come into play as the new Bolivian government tries to steer a path of economic and 
political reform. In contrast to some of the rhetoric during the election campaign, the new 
government has stated clearly its desire to maintain good relations with the United States. The Bush 
                                                 
6 Data are purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP per capita. 
7 The latest poverty estimate is for 2002. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Bolivia (http://www.ine.gov.bo/). 
8 The country has an indigenous majority, which is disproportionately poor and heretofore politically marginalized and 
excluded; the new president, Evo Morales, is the country’s first indigenous president and has pledged to remedy this 
situation. 
9 This is also on a PPP basis; on an exchange rate basis, which is useful for some comparisons, Bolivia’s GDP is much 
less, just $9.5 billion or less than one-thousandth of U.S. GDP. 
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Administration has so far given mixed signals.
10 More importantly, Washington appears to have 
goals for Bolivia that are strongly opposed by the political base of the current government, and go 
against its promises to the electorate. Among these are an aggressive coca eradication program,
11 
Bolivia’s accession to an AFTA, and a rewriting of the country’s May 2005 hydrocarbons law that 
provided for increased royalties and renegotiation of contracts with private foreign-owned gas 
companies. 
It is therefore worth looking at Bolivia’s potential vulnerability to any reductions in foreign aid, 
export markets, loans and debt cancellation. This paper looks at Bolivia’s current economic 
situation, with a focus on the external sector and various potential “pressure points.” It also 
considers the possibilities for reducing the country’s vulnerability to external political decisions, so as 
to allow for more policy space for the new government to promote more rapid economic growth 
and poverty reduction. 
                                                 
10 President Bush did call President Morales on February 1 to congratulate him on his victory. On the other hand, 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said that “elections like Evo Morales in Bolivia take place that clearly are 
worrisome.” See “Secretary Rumsfeld’s Remarks at the National Press Club,” Washington DC, February 2, 2006, 
(http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2006/tr20060203-12436.html). And Washington cut off military aid in the 
federal budget proposal released on February 8 because the Bolivian Congress has refused to ratify an agreement 
which would exempt United States citizens from being brought before the International Criminal Court. U.S. law 
prohibits military aid to countries that have not ratified such an agreement, but some countries who, like Bolivia, have 
signed the agreement but not had it ratified by their legislatures, have not been cut off.  See “Budget Would Slash 
Bolivia Military Aid,” by Joel Brinkley, The New York Times, February 8, 2006. 
11 See e.g. “Bolivia's Knot: No to Cocaine, But Yes to Coca,” by Juan Forero, New York Times, February 12, 2006. 
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External Public Debt and Conditionality  
Table 1 shows the structure of Bolivia’s public debt, in millions of current dollars and as a 
percentage of GDP, for the last 5 years. As can be seen from the chart, most of the government’s 
debt (70.2%) is external debt. More than 90 percent of that external debt is owed to multilateral 
lending institutions. The chart includes $243.8 million that was owed to the IMF, of which $232.5 
million was cancelled this year.  Thus, the second column for 2005 shows the current total of $13.9 
million. 
The cancelled IMF debt represented only 4.7% percent of the total external public debt. 
Nonetheless this cancellation is very important. First, it is still a significant amount of money, about 
2.5 percent off GDP; and the IMF had projected debt service payments to the Fund of $236 million 
for the years 2006-2009, which have now been reduced to $16.5 million. 
Perhaps more importantly, the cancellation of IMF debt makes it easier for the new Bolivian 
government to re-evaluate its relationship with the Fund, which has had a heavy presence there for 
the last 20 years, as noted above. Bolivia is currently under a Standby Arrangement
12 with the IMF, 
which expires March 31. The Standby Arrangement was originally approved in April 2003 for a one-
year period and has been extended several times; it was intended to be a bridge agreement towards a 
longer term agreement under the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PGRF).
13 The 
question of whether Bolivia wants to continue borrowing from the Fund – in either a short-term or 
long-term agreement – given the conditions attached to its lending, could prove to be very 
important for the new government. 
The track record of the Fund’s involvement in Bolivia over the last 20 years raises serious questions 
about its policy advice. As noted above, the country’s income per person remains below its level of 
20 years ago. The government’s fiscal situation is still seriously weakened from the 1998 
privatization of Bolivia’s social security system, which was one of the reforms that the country 
implemented under the advice and promotion of the IMF/World Bank. When switching from a 
“pay-as-you-go” system, as the United States currently has, to a system of private accounts, there are 
very large transition costs. Current retirees must be paid for a period of decades, without the 
revenue that had previously been provided from payroll taxes, while the private accounts accumulate 
enough savings to pay a retirement income. The government is currently spending 4.1 percent of 
GDP annually on pensions, more than the entire public sector deficit. Most of this spending is the 
result of Social Security privatization.
14 Thus, this one structural reform is responsible for most of 
the government’s current budget deficit, as well as a significant amount of debt accumulation since 
1998. 
                                                 
12 This is a short-term IMF lending facility that requires certain structural and financial benchmarks and performance 
criteria to be met. 
13 This is an IMF facility known until November 1999 as the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 
Countries that borrow under the PGRF must be eligible for loans from the World Bank’s concessional lending arm, 
the IDA (International Development Association).  
14 This has been a major problem for other privatized systems in Latin America, including Chile and Argentina (see 
Baker and Weisbrot (2002), “The Role of Social Security Privatization in Argentina's Economic Crisis,”). For a poor 
country such as Bolivia with a lower tax base it is even more of a problem. 
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TABLE 1
Bolivia: Total Public Debt, 2000-2005
(in current US$ millions and % of GDP) 
External
Multilateral 3077.3 36.6% 3261.1 40.0% 3637.2 45.8% 4318.4 53.3% 4662 53.1% 4519.9 48.4% 4290.0 45.9%
IMF 220.2 2.6% 207 2.5% 194.6 2.5% 276.5 3.4% 306 3.5% 243.8 2.6% 13.9** 0.1%
IDB 1392.8 16.6% 1373.7 16.8% 1450.2 18.3% 1626.5 20.1% 1658.2 18.9% 1622.8 17.4% 1622.8 17.4%
World Bank 1096.3 13.0% 1146.8 14.1% 1323.5 16.7% 1571.2 19.4% 1748.6 19.9% 1666.6 17.8% 1666.6 17.8%
CAF 255.4 3.0% 420.7 5.2% 577.4 7.3% 740.6 9.1% 836.9 9.5% 871.3 9.3% 871.3 9.3%
Other 112.6 1.3% 112.9 1.4% 91.5 1.2% 103.6 1.3% 112.3 1.3% 115.4 1.2% 115.4 1.2%
Bilateral 1371.8 16.3% 1227.2 15.1% 757 9.5% 820.6 10.1% 382.9 4.4% 420.7 4.5% 420.7 4.5%
Japan 523.4 6.2% 464.1 5.7% 513.5 6.5% 567.6 7.0% 71.6 0.8% 63 0.7% 63 0.7%
Germany 325.4 3.9% 306.1 3.8% 6.9 0.1% 9.5 0.1% 39.1 0.4% 34 0.4% 34 0.4%
Belgium 57.7 0.7% 54.8 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Spain 142.3 1.7% 137.8 1.7% 134.9 1.7% 130.9 1.6% 142.8 1.6% 139.3 1.5% 139.3 1.5%
France 40.7 0.5% 37.9 0.5% 16.1 0.2% 17.2 0.2% 17.2 0.2% 13.3 0.1% 13.3 0.1%
USA 60.1 0.7% 59.3 0.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
UK 18.1 0.2% 17.9 0.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Brazil 21.9 0.3% 33.5 0.4% 56.2 0.7% 73.5 0.9% 87.4 1.0% 121.5 1.3% 121.5 1.3%
Other 182.2 2.2% 115.8 1.4% 29.4 0.4% 21.9 0.3% 24.8 0.3% 49.6 0.5% 49.6 0.5%
Private 11.2 0.1% 8.4 0.1% 5.5 0.1% 2.8 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 0.2 0.0% 0.2 0.0%
Total External 4460.3 53.0% 4496.7 55.1% 4399.7 55.4% 5141.8 63.5% 5045.3 57.4% 4940.8 52.9% 4710.9 50.4%
Domestic
Public Sector* 55.0 0.7% 68.5 0.8% 64.5 0.8% 55.3 0.7% 38.9 0.4% 44.6 0.5% 44.6 0.5%
Private Sector 780.6 9.3% 1192.9 14.6% 1267.0 16.0% 1463.6 18.1% 1729.5 19.7% 1953.3 20.9% 1953.3 20.9%
OMAs (Market Auctions) 263.6 3.1% 538.9 6.6% 460.5 5.8% 531.7 6.6% 660.5 7.5% 726.3 7.8% 726.3 7.8%
AFPs (Pensions) 517.0 6.1% 654.0 8.0% 786.0 9.9% 913.1 11.3% 1049.0 11.9% 1207.0 12.9% 1207.0 12.9%
Other 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 20.5 0.3% 18.8 0.2% 20.0 0.2% 20.0 0.2% 20.0 0.2%
Total Domestic* 835.6 9.9% 1261.4 15.5% 1331.4 16.8% 1518.9 18.8% 1768.4 20.1% 1997.8 21.4% 1997.8 21.4%
Grand Total 5295.9 63.0% 5758.1 70.6% 5731.1 72.2% 6660.7 82.2% 6813.7 77.6% 6938.6 74.3% 6708.7 71.8%
Sources: Banco Central de Bolivia, Ministerio de Hacienda, WEO Sept. 2005
* Does not include domestic debt owed to the Central Bank
** This value reflects IMF debt cancellation of US$ 232.5 million plus exchange rate variation of US$ 2.6 million 
2004 2005 2005
(before IMF cancellation) (after IMF cancellation)
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Moreover, in recent documents the Fund has been advocating against the May 2005 hydrocarbons 
law
15, which increased the royalty payments by foreign gas companies and provided for the 
renegotiation of some of their contracts. The increased revenue from these legal changes is very 
important to the government’s fiscal balance as well as its ability to undertake projects that would 
reduce poverty or improve the health of the population. Table 2 shows the IMF’s most recent 
projections (from November 2005) for government revenue from hydrocarbons. 
TABLE 2
Bolivia: Macroeconomic Indicators, (2005-2010) Projections (International Monetary Fund)*
Prel. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj. Proj.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(Annual percentage changes)
Real GDP Growth  3.6 3.9 4.1 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.0
Growth in hydrocarbons production 23.8 14.9 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CPI (end of period) 4.6 4.2 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
(In percent of GDP)
Public Sector
Total Revenue 26.8 29.0 29.6 29.2 28.8 28.3 28.0
Of which: Hydrocarbons 1/ 3.4 5.4 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.5 5.2
Interest 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3
Overall balance -5.5 -3.5 -3.0 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -1.9
Of which: Pension-related balance -4.3- 4 . 1- 3 . 9- 3 . 7- 3 . 7- 3 . 7- 3 . 7
Net domestic financing 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7
Net external financing 3.9 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2
(In percent of GDP)
External Sector
Trade balance 3.4 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.8
Current account balance 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.2
Gas exports 7.1 9.2 9.6 9.2 8.7 8.1 7.6
Net foreign direct investment 1.3 1.6 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Memorandum item:
GDP (US$ million) 8784.0 9751.0 10471.0 11209.0 11879.0 12607.0 13367.0
* IMF 2005b, table 7
1/ Excluding excise taxes on fuel products
 
As can be seen from the table, the increase from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2004, to 5.4 percent in 2005 
and a projected 6.7 percent ($628 million) for 2006 is quite significant. The Fund then projects a 
decline in revenues – with zero growth in hyrdrocarbons production between 2007 and 2010 – and 
 
                                                 
15 “The design of that [hydrocarbons] law raises serious concerns in terms of its potential adverse impact on the 
development of this key sector of the Bolivian economy” (IMF 2005b, p.22). See also pp. 12, 14, and 18. Bolivia’s Challenges    10 
correspondingly reduced GDP growth – on the theory that the new law will discourage investment 
in the industry.
16 
But these projections are almost certainly wrong. On February 10, Petrobras, the Brazilian state-run 
oil company, announced a plan to invest $5 billion in Bolivia’s gas industry.
17 This is an enormous 
amount of investment relative to Bolivia’s economy, and exceeds the total invested in gas 
production by private companies since the sector was privatized ten years ago. This should provide 
grounds for caution with regard to the Fund’s projections, and advice that is based on them.
18  
Some of the IMF’s goals for Bolivia
19 such as de-dollarization of the economy, or the creation of a 
system of deposit insurance, are potentially beneficial.
20 But others are not necessarily helpful: for 
example, the privatization of remaining banks where the state has a majority interest, increased 
flexibility of the exchange rate, increasing the independence of the central bank, or legal changes 
regarding corporate restructuring and bankruptcy. The IMF’s track record in the last few years on 
macroeconomic policy, for example in Argentina,
21 provides further grounds for caution in 
concluding any further agreements with the Fund. 
In light of these considerations and others
22 it would not be surprising if the new government of 
Bolivia were to allow the current agreement with the IMF to expire at the end of March and not 
seek any renewal. However, this would not necessarily end the role of the IMF in Bolivia’s future. 
Historically, the IMF has played the role of “gatekeeper” for credit from other sources of loans and 
grants – including the much larger lending of the World Bank (for non-project lending), the IDB, 
                                                 
16 “Discussions with the private sector suggest that these provisions [increased tax burden on foreign corporations and 
renegotiation of current contracts] will likely discourage new large investment in the hydrocarbons sector over the 
medium term. Accordingly, the updated medium-term outlook incorporates a broadly flat path for natural gas 
production and export volumes and correspondingly conservative real GDP growth assumptions.” (IMF 2005b, p.15). 
17 See “Petrobas to invest $5bn in Bolivia’s gas sector,” by Hal Weitzman, Financial Times, February 13, 2006. 
18 The IMF has been shown to have a systematic bias in its projections on Latin America (see Baker and Rosnick (2003) 
“Too Sunny in Latin America,” and "The Accuracy of World Economic Outlook Growth Forecasts: 1991-2000" in 
IMF 2001, pp. 37-39). This study shows a systematic upward bias for growth, but it appears to be the opposite in cases 
where the IMF opposes the government’s policies – e.g. Argentina and Venezuela. In Argentina, where the 
government rejected the IMF’s advice on a number of important policies, the IMF in January of 2003 projected 35 
percent inflation and 2.5 percent growth for that year. The actual results were 3.7 percent inflation and 8.8 percent 
growth. 
19 As set forth in IMF 2005a, IMF 2005b, IMF 2005c.  
20 The Bolivian economy is sensitive to runs on deposits in the banking system (as happened in 2002 and 2004), because 
about 60 percent of the country’s deposits are held by just one percent of depositors (IMF 2005b, p.16). A deposit 
insurance system, provided it was properly regulated, could reduce this source of instability. The high level of 
dollarization of the economy is also a source of instability, as the balance sheets of companies with liabilities in dollars 
and revenues in domestic currency (bolivianos) are very vulnerable to exchange rate changes. 
21 There is strong evidence that Argentina’s rapid economic recovery from the severe 1998-2002 recession – growth has 
averaged more than 9 percent annually over the last three years – was accomplished with policies that were opposed by 
the Fund. Among these were the Central Bank’s targeting of a stable and competitive exchange rate, an export tax 
(which helped close most of the fiscal gap in the early stages of recovery), and a freeze on utility prices. The Fund also 
advocated a tighter fiscal and monetary policy and a more favorable settlement with foreign creditors than was 
ultimately chosen by the government of Argentina (See Cibils, Weisbrot, and Kar (2002), “Argentina Since Default: 
The IMF and the Depression;” Frenkel and Rapetti (2006), “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Argentina after 
the Convertibility Regime Collapse;” and Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti (2005), “The Argentinean Debt: History, 
Default and Restructuring.” 
22 The internal politics of Bolivia would also favor a break with the IMF, as the institution is not well liked among the 
government’s base, some of whom hold the Fund’s policies responsible not only for Bolivia’s economic failure but 
also for the violence of February 2003 (Shultz 2005), see Schultz, Jim. 2005. Deadly Consequences. Cochabamba: The 
Democracy Center. 
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bilateral lenders (e.g. USAID), and the governments of high-income countries. At its strongest this 
informal relationship among lenders (it is not a part of these organizations’ written rules) has 
resulted in a powerful creditors’ cartel that, headed by the U.S. Treasury Department,
23 has had a 
considerable influence over the economic policies of low-and middle-income countries; at its mildest 
it is seen by e.g., European donor governments as an “auditor” to insure that their money is not 
being wasted. 
The relevant question here is whether an agreement with the IMF, or the lack of it, will be a 
condition for other sources of funding – especially the World Bank, IDB, and the high-income 
country governments. In the past this would almost certainly be true, as it generally has been over 
the last 20 years of IMF agreements with Bolivia. However, this may not be true today. The power 
of the IMF has declined drastically since the late 1990s. After the East Asian economic crisis the 
middle income countries of that region began to accumulate large amounts of foreign exchange 
reserves, partly to avoid ever having to borrow from the IMF again. The experience of Argentina 
since 2002, in which the country rejected key policy recommendations of the IMF and received no 
net funding from the Fund or allied multilateral lenders,
24 and experienced a robust economic 
recovery, also had the effect of greatly reducing the IMF’s influence over middle-income countries. 
Most recently, there has been a sharply reduced demand for IMF loans. In the past few months two 
of its biggest borrowers – Argentina and Brazil, paid in full their remaining debt to the IMF. These 
were considerable amounts of money: $9.8 billion (5.5 percent of GDP) for Argentina and $15.5 
billion (2 percent of GDP) for Brazil. Indonesia, another of the IMF’s largest borrowers has recently 
decided to pay off its $7.8 billion (2.8 percent of GDP) to the IMF. 
As noted, it has been middle-income developing countries where the Fund has lost influence – the 
situation for poorer countries with respect to the multi-lateral lenders has not changed much. So it 
remains to be seen whether the IMF’s traditional role will be invoked at this time in Bolivia. As with 
the other questions considered below, it will be a decision that will be influenced by political 
conditions, including Bolivia’s perceived bargaining power. 
The July 8, 2005 decision among the G-8 countries to cancel the IMF debt for 18 HIPC countries, 
including Bolivia, also set in motion a process to cancel these countries’ World Bank debt (IDA 
2005). For Bolivia, the amount to be cancelled is $1.53 billion of the $1.62 billion owed to the Bank, 
although the terms of the cancellation have not been finalized. The cancellation will take place over 
a period of 40 years, although it is not exactly clear why it is being implemented in this way.  From 
the point of view of Bolivia’s (or other recipient countries’) annual finances, it does not appear to be 
different from the cancellation of the debt all at once, as was done with the IMF debt. In other 
words, once the cancellation is finalized, Bolivia will not be paying interest or principal on the debt 
that remains on the books over the 40-year period. The commitment to cancel the World Bank debt 
is at this time probably irreversible, although it has recently been delayed. So this debt ($1.53 billion) 
can be seen as cancelled in the near future. 
                                                 
23 The United States Treasury Department has a dominant role in IMF decision making, especially with regard to Latin 
America and any other areas that are of strategic interest to the U.S. government. Voting is proportional to 
contributions, and the U.S. not only holds a veto power over important decisions, but in practice the other high-
income countries have virtually always deferred to U.S. Treasury on matters of concern to Washington over the last 61 
years. 
24 The multilateral lenders actually took a net $4 billion (almost all IMF) out of Argentina during 2002, and more than 
$14 billion from 2002-2005.  
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The other large portion of Bolivia’s debt – $1.6 billion or 32 percent of the country’s external debt – 
is owed to the IDB. Discussions are underway for the cancellation of debt owed to the IDB by the 
four Latin American HIPC countries (Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras, and Nicaragua) plus Haiti. For 
Bolivia, this would be $1.3 billion of the $1.6 billion owed to the IDB.  
It would be expected that the IDB would participate in the debt cancellation that has been arranged 
through this latest Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI). The IDB provided 34.5 percent ($155 
million) of Bolivia’s debt relief under the original HIPC debt relief and committed to 36 percent 
($307 million) of cancellation under the enhanced HIPC initiative (IMF and IDA, 2001). And as 
recently as December, the U.S. State Department reiterated President Bush’s remarks at the Mar del 
Plata Summit, that the IDB should “implement measures that will better employ the bank's assets, 
including addressing the debt sustainability of the poorest countries in the region, and possible debt 
relief”.
25 The question thus arises as to whether the possibility of IDB debt cancellation could be 
used to pressure Bolivia with regard to its economic policies.  
If the IDB decides to proceed with debt cancellation for these HIPC countries, it would be 
politically difficult to single out Bolivia for denial of this cancellation. Three of the four countries are 
at about the same per capita income level, with only Nicaragua significantly lower: Bolivia ($960), 
Guyana ($1030), Honduras ($990), and Nicaragua ($790).
26 
Furthermore, Bolivia has passed the “completion point” for the Enhanced HIPC initiative, which 
made it eligible for debt cancellation under this latest MDRI. This meant passing the latest hurdles in 
a long list of conditions over several years. A “long track record of sound macroeconomic policies 
and substantial structural adjustment” according to the IMF and World Bank 2005, had enabled 
Bolivia to reach the completion point under the original HIPC initiative in September 1998 (IMF 
and IDA 2001, p. 4). The next step was the “decision point” for the Enhanced HIPC initiative, 
which was reached in February 2000; then the completion point for Enhanced HIPC in June 2001. 
For the latter, Bolivia had to meet a set of quantitative financial benchmarks and structural reform 
criteria under the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The IMF and World Bank 
decided that “virtually all quantitative targets had been met” under the PRGF; and also that there 
was progress on structural reforms, for example in the areas of customs, the internal revenue service, 
tax procedures, and budget management (IMF and IDA 2001, p. 21). 
Perhaps more importantly, since meeting these criteria, Bolivia’s macroeconomic performance – 
according to the criteria most important to the multilateral lenders – has improved enormously. In 
2002 the government was running a public sector budget deficit of 8.8 percent of GDP; for 2005 it 
is 3.5 percent and the IMF projects 3.0 percent for 2006. The country has also gone from a $324 
million (4.1 percent of GDP) current account deficit in 2002 to a $205 million (2.1% percent of 
GDP) surplus for 2005 (IMF 2005b, pp. 26, 30).  So it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to conceive of a performance-based reason to deny debt relief to Bolivia for which the 
other HIPC countries in the hemisphere were deemed eligible. 
                                                 
25 See, “A Prosperous Third Border,” speech given by the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, E. 
Anthony Wayne, to the Caribbean Central American Action's 29th Annual Miami Conference, December 7, 2005. 
Available via the internet: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2005/57923.htm  
26 This is GNI (Gross National Income) per capita in 2004 U.S. dollars, Atlas Method, which is the method used to 
determine IDA and HIPC eligibility, and presumably would be used for the IDB as well. But if PPP GDP or even 
dollar GDP per capita based on and exchange rate conversion were used, it would not put Bolivia significantly ahead 
of any country but Nicaragua. 
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Financial Flows: Loans and Grants 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the disbursements, debt service, and net transfers for Bolivia’s external 
public borrowing for the years 2000-2005. Looking at disbursements first (Table 3), it can be seen 
that these peaked at $701.6 million (8.7 percent of GDP) in 2003, declining to $447.3 million (4.8 
percent of GDP) in 2005. Of the multilateral lenders, the largest by far has been the Corporación 
Andina de Fomento (CAF), which lends at non-concessional (commercial) interest rates. This was 
not true in the past; prior to 1999, the CAF was far behind the World Bank and IDB in its lending.  
This highlights an important trend for Bolivia that is almost certain to continue: the movement from 
concessional (low-interest) loans to non-concessional lending.
27 As part of the arrangement by which 
the World Bank debt is to be cancelled, future Bank loans may be reduced (IDA 2005, p. 7). The 
IDB could also have a similar arrangement for its debt cancellations. These are the two major 
sources of concessional lending to Bolivia, and they can be expected to decline in coming years.
  
                                                
A major reason that Bolivia will lose concessional lending is that as the economy grows, it will 
exceed the per capita income limits for concessional lending – the operational cutoff for eligibility 
for IDA
28 lending for fiscal year 2006 is $965 (2004 GNI); Bolivia’s 2004 GNI is $960. 
TABLE 3
Bolivia: External Debt, Disbursements (2000-2005)
(in current US$ millions and % of GDP)
Debtholder
Multilateral 263.7 3.1% 436.3 5.4% 495.1 6.2% 679.6 8.4% 461.8 5.3% 364.9 3.9%
IMF 15.1 0.2% 23.7 0.3% 0 0.0% 88.8 1.1% 54.9 0.6% 14.6 0.2%
World Bank 60.6 0.7% 101.9 1.2% 103.8 1.3% 142.4 1.8% 124.2 1.4% 70.4 0.8%
IDB 96.3 1.1% 84.3 1.0% 99.4 1.3% 195.4 2.4% 91.5 1.0% 111.4 1.2%
CAF 83.9 1.0% 216.2 2.7% 288.5 3.6% 241.4 3.0% 180.4 2.1% 154.8 1.7%
Other 7.8 0.1% 10.2 0.1% 3.4 0.0% 11.6 0.1% 10.8 0.1% 13.7 0.1%
Bilateral 41.3 0.5% 49 0.6% 47.2 0.6% 22 0.3% 90.2 1.0% 82.5 0.9%
Germany 16.9 0.2% 13.4 0.2% 11 0.1% 1.1 0.0% 28 0.3% 0.1 0.0%
Japan 4 0.0% 11.5 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Spain 14.9 0.2% 5.8 0.1% 9.9 0.1% 3.2 0.0% 19.9 0.2% 7.3 0.1%
Italy 1.5 0.0% 1.4 0.0% 1.9 0.0% 0 0.0% 5 0.1% 1.5 0.0%
Brazil 0 0.0% 11.6 0.1% 22.7 0.3% 17.3 0.2% 35.8 0.4% 42 0.4%
China 0.8 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 21.9 0.2%
Other 3.2 0.0% 5.4 0.1% 1.6 0.0% 0.4 0.0% 1.4 0.0% 9.8 0.1%
Private 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
      
Total 305 3.6% 485.4 6.0% 542.3 6.8% 701.6 8.7% 552.2 6.3% 447.3 4.8%
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia
2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
 
27 CAF lending is non-concessional. 
28 IDA is the branch of the World Bank that lends to low-income countries. Bolivia’s Challenges    14 
TABLE 4
Bolivia: External Debt, Debt Service (2000-2005)
(in current US$ millions and % of GDP)
Debtholder
Multilateral 200.5 2.4% 195.7 2.4% 235.6 3.0% 251.6 3.1% 273.7 3.1% 347.5 3.7%
IMF 21.1 0.3% 21.2 0.3% 18.4 0.2% 22.2 0.3% 24.3 0.3% 45.5 0.5%
World Bank 13.3 0.2% 1.4 0.0% 11.8 0.1% 14.5 0.2% 19.6 0.2% 20.9 0.2%
IDB 96.9 1.2% 86.7 1.1% 86.7 1.1% 105.6 1.3% 108 1.2% 99 1.1%
CAF 57.6 0.7% 75.1 0.9% 113 1.4% 104.1 1.3% 116.4 1.3% 173.7 1.9%
Other 11.6 0.1% 11.3 0.1% 5.7 0.1% 5.2 0.1% 5.4 0.1% 8.4 0.1%
Bilateral 61.6 0.7% 49.9 0.6% 19.2 0.2% 18.2 0.2% 10.5 0.1% 19.9 0.2%
Germany 9.3 0.1% 5.4 0.1% 0 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0.3 0.0%
Japan 17.4 0.2% 15.6 0.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Belgium 0.5 0.0% 0.5 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Spain 16.7 0.2% 12.3 0.2% 10.7 0.1% 6.4 0.1% 1.9 0.0% 2 0.0%
France 3.2 0.0% 2.2 0.0% 1.7 0.0% 2.3 0.0% 2.7 0.0% 2.7 0.0%
USA 4.4 0.1% 3.2 0.0% 0.1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Other 10.1 0.1% 10.9 0.1% 6.7 0.1% 9.3 0.1% 5.8 0.1% 14.9 0.2%
Private 6.3 0.1% 3.6 0.0% 3.3 0.0% 3 0.0% 2.6 0.0% 0.2 0.0%
Total 268.4 3.2% 249.2 3.1% 258.2 3.3% 272.6 3.4% 286.9 3.3% 367.6 3.9%
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia
2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
TABLE 5
Bolivia: External Debt, Net Transfers (2000-2005)
(in current US$ millions and % of GDP)
Debtholder
Multilateral 63.4 0.8% 241.3 3.0% 259.7 3.3% 428.2 5.3% 188.2 2.1% 17.3 0.2%
IMF -5.9 -0.1% 2.5 0.0% -18.4 -0.2% 66.6 0.8% 30.6 0.3% -31 -0.3%
World Bank 47.3 0.6% 101 1.2% 92.1 1.2% 128 1.6% 104.5 1.2% 49.5 0.5%
IDB -0.6 0.0% -2.4 0.0% 12.7 0.2% 89.8 1.1% -16.4 -0.2% 12.4 0.1%
CAF 26.3 0.3% 141.9 1.7% 175.6 2.2% 137.4 1.7% 64 0.7% -18.9 -0.2%
Other -3.7 0.0% -1.7 0.0% -2.3 0.0% 6.4 0.1% 5.5 0.1% 5.3 0.1%
Bilateral -20.3 -0.2% -0.9 0.0% 27.9 0.4% 3.9 0.0% 79.7 0.9% 62.6 0.7%
Germany 7.3 0.1% 7.9 0.1% 11 0.1% 1 0.0% 27.9 0.3% -0.2 0.0%
Japan -13.4 -0.2% -4.2 -0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Spain -1.7 0.0% -6.5 -0.1% -0.8 0.0% -3.2 0.0% 18 0.2% 5.2 0.1%
Brazil 0 0.0% 11.6 0.1% 22.4 0.3% 16.8 0.2% 33.9 0.4% 29.9 0.3%
Other -12.5 -0.1% -9.8 -0.1% -4.7 -0.1% -10.7 -0.1% -0.1 0.0% 27.7 0.3%
Private -6.3 -0.1% -3.6 0.0% -3.3 0.0% -3 0.0% -2.6 0.0% -0.2 0.0%
Total 36.8 0.4% 236.9 2.9% 284.3 3.6% 429 5.3% 265.3 3.0% 79.7 0.9%
Source: Banco Central de Bolivia
2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003Bolivia’s Challenges    15 
Bilateral lending in 2005 was $82.5 million, or 23 percent of external public borrowing. Most of this 
came from Brazil and China. 
Although multilateral lending has been an important source of funding for Bolivia’s public sector, 
the picture changes somewhat when we subtract debt service (Table 4) from disbursements (Table 
3) and look at net transfers (Table 5). Net transfers to the government were only $17.3 million from 
the multilateral lenders in 2005, with bilateral transfers at $62.6 million. Total net transfers for 
external borrowing by the government were $79.7 million, or 0.85 percent of GDP.  
This is significant but not a very high level of dependence on net external borrowing. For the near 
future, Bolivia’s debt service to the IDB is projected at $476 million, and to the World Bank is 
projected at $173 million. If both of these debt cancellations come through, most of this $649 
million in debt service over the next four years would be cancelled. It is worth noting (see Table 2) 
that even the IMF’s projections – which as noted above, assume (probably incorrectly) that growth 
in the hydrocarbon sector falls off sharply to zero – show a sharp falloff in the amount of external 
financing for Bolivia’s public sector, from 3.9 percent of GDP in 2004 to 1.4 percent in 2008. 
The next set of aid flows to consider consists of grants and donations. Table 6 lists grants and 
donations that are included as revenues for Bolivia’s national budget. For 2006, these are projected 
at $110 million or about one percent of GDP. The largest amount, $24.6 million or nearly a quarter 
of the total, comes from the European Union. Another $29 million is contributed by Spain, the 
Netherlands, and Germany; thus a majority of grants and donations to the Bolivian government 
come from Europe, and EU countries also contribute to the “basket funding” of $17 million. Only 
$8.5 million comes directly from the United States, from USAID. 
The United States does supply other funding through its “Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs” – $90.3 million for 2005. Washington also contributed $48.2 million for 
other projects.
29 However, other than the $8.4 million from USAID noted in Table 6, this money 
does not fund the central government. 
Summing up the situation regarding aid flows, it does not look like Bolivia would be very vulnerable 
to threats of aid reduction. With regard to net external borrowing, as described above, concessional 
lending is winding down, and debt cancellation will greatly reduce future debt service.  
As we have seen, grants and donations that form part of government revenue are fairly small, with 
most coming from Europe. The other money from USAID is similar in amount but since it does 
not fund government operations, it matters mainly as a source of foreign exchange. But Bolivia’s 
foreign exchange reserves are growing, and can be expected to grow with expanding hydrocarbon 
revenues; and the country is running a current account surplus.  
The United States therefore does not have much direct leverage with regard to aid flows. The big 
question, other than the cancellation of the IDB debt, is what role the IMF might play in deciding 
on future loan disbursements and aid flows. In the past, the Fund was the gatekeeper for most of 
these flows, including the IDB, the World Bank, and also some of the grants and donations that 
Bolivia has received from European governments. As described previously, the IMF’s role in this 
respect is in a state of transition internationally. For the reasons listed above, it would seem 
                                                 
29 Most of the money from both of these sums is funneled through USAID. 
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TABLE 6
Bolivia: Grants and Donations 2006
Government / Organization US$ millions % of GDP
European Union 24.64 0.24%




German Bank for Reconstruction  5.64 0.05%
International Development Agency (IDA) 5.17 0.05%
Denmark 5.13 0.05%
World Food Program 3.57 0.03%
Japan International Cooperation Agency 2.90 0.03%
Belgian Technical Cooperation 2.14 0.02%
UN Global Environment Facility 1.99 0.02%
Inter-American Development Bank 1.10 0.01%




Source: Presupuesto General de la Nacion, Ministerio de Hacienda
Viceministerio de Presupuesto y Contaduria
Note: Dollar amounts and percentages are based on a projected exchange rate of 
Bs. 8.12 per US$ and a nominal GDP of Bs. 85,029 millions by the Ministry of Finance of Bolivia
*Funds donated by various sources, including countries, multilateral organizations or financial 
institutions, geared toward specific government programs.  Funders contributing to basket funding
include: Denmark, EC, Finland, France, Germany, IADB, IMF, Netherlands, Norway, OECD,
Sweden, UK, UNDP, United States and World Bank.
** Total does not include debt relief under HIPC initiative
 
inappropriate for the IMF to continue to play this role. This is even more true if the government 
does not sign a new agreement with the IMF.  
Another factor that has significantly changed the equation for the region with regard to countries’ 
vulnerability to foreign aid and capital flows has been Venezuela’s lending to governments. 
Venezuela has committed some $2.4 billion to Argentina, and has bought $300 million of 
government bonds from Ecuador. In the case of Argentina, the Venezuelan bond purchases helped 
enable the country to pay off its remaining debt to the IMF, and Venezuela’s President Hugo 
Chavez stated that Venezuela would loan whatever would be necessary for the Argentine 
government to cut loose from the IMF.
30 Chavez has made similar commitments to the new 
government of Bolivia, and Venezuela has over $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves, a large part 
of which are not necessary to guarantee the country’s foreign transactions or exchange rate. So it 
appears that for the near future, at least, Bolivia will likely have access to other sources of foreign 
financing, should they become necessary.
 
                                                 
30 See, for example, “Argentina Debt Plan Praised, Criticized,” December 16, 2005, Associated Press Financial Wire. Bolivia’s Challenges    17 
Trade  
About $359 million, or 16 percent of Bolivia’s exports go to the U.S. market.
31 Access to this market 
is almost certain to remain unaffected, in the foreseeable future, by any disagreements with the 
United States over coca eradication, hydrocarbons policy, or other non-trade issues. With regard to 
trade, then, the main issue is whether Washington will use preferential access to the U.S. market – 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug 
Eradication Act (ATPDEA) – as leverage to try to get Bolivia to sign a new trade agreement. 
The new proposed trade agreement would most likely be the AFTA, for which negotiations began in 
May 2004 with Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, with Bolivia as an observer. The negotiations have not 
proceeded smoothly, which generally has been true for regional and multilateral agreements in recent 
years. Among the U.S. demands that have been problematic are increased protection for intellectual 
property rights, particularly pharmaceutical patents, where Washington has demanded in its bilateral 
and regional agreements protections and rights for patent holders that go beyond those provided by 
the World Trade Organization, and that would increase the price of medicines in signatory countries. 
The opening of agricultural markets, in many cases to subsidized exports from the United States, has 
also been a sticking point in regional and bilateral negotiations and could cause problems for Bolivia. 
The ATPDEA preferences expire at the end of 2006, and some important U.S. legislators have 
threatened that they will not be renewed – that is, only countries that have signed a new AFTA or 
similar agreement will enjoy these trade preferences. However that is extremely unlikely at this time. 
Ecuador has not concluded negotiations on a trade agreement with the United States, and while the 
administration has announced that negotiations with Peru and Colombia have concluded, the official 
notification of the intent to sign a commercial agreement has not been sent to the U.S. Congress for 
the latter country. Under the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, such notification triggers a 
mandatory, minimum 90-day waiting period before an agreement can be officially signed. Only once 
this period has passed and an agreement has been signed may Congress take a vote on ratification of 
implementing legislation.
32 
In the United States, these agreements have not passed Congress easily as of late. The Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) took more than a year and passed, after formidable White 
House lobbying, by only one vote. Since this is an election year, it is unlikely that such controversial 
agreements would be brought to a vote before the November 2006 election, which means not until 
next year. Thus the ATPDEA preferences will very likely have to be renewed; once again, there is no 
politically feasible way to single Bolivia out for denial of these preferences.  
However, even in the very unlikely event that the preferences for Bolivia under the ATPDEA were 
allowed to expire at the end of the year, the impact on Bolivia would not be very large. Only a small 
portion of Bolivia’s exports would be affected, since most of Bolivia’s exports fall under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
33 or the WTO’s MFN treatment. The total value of 
exports at risk of losing their preferential access is almost certainly less than 2 percent of Bolivia’s 
exports. Although this is not insignificant, it should be kept in mind that most of this is in the 
textiles and apparel sector, which is facing very harsh, unrestricted competition from China since the 
                                                 
31 Figures are for 2004, the latest complete data available. 
32 See 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (“Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority: Implementation of Trade Agreements”), and “Notice 
of Intention to Enter Into a Free Trade Agreement with Peru,” White House Press Release, Jan. 6, 2006. 
33 The GSP also expires at the end of 2006 but there seems to be little controversy over its renewal. 
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beginning of 2005, when the system of quotas that developing countries were allocated for the U.S. 
market (the Multi-Fiber Arrangement) expired.  
It is also worth noting that in coming years the market for imports in the United States is not going 
to grow as it has in the past. It is widely recognized by the vast majority of economists that the U.S. 
trade and current account deficit is not sustainable. As a result, the dollar will have to fall, and the 
U.S. trade deficit will adjust. The result of this adjustment is that the market for imports (measured 
in non-dollar terms) in the U.S. will have to shrink over the next decade.
34 This means that 
developing countries that want to increase their exports to the U.S. market will have to displace 
other exporters (e.g. Mexico or China) that are already there. 
To sum up the situation regarding trade, it seems unlikely that that threat of canceling trade 
preferences could be used to alter the new government’s course with regard to either trade or other 
policy issues. 
                                                 
34 This is not an adjustment to balanced trade, but rather to an amount that allows the U.S. foreign debt to stabilize at a 
sustainable level. See Baker and Weisbrot (2004), http://www.cepr.net/publications/trade_2004_01_08.pdf . 
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Conclusion 
Bolivia’s new government has come to power promising to reform economic policy so as to 
improve the condition of its poor majority. This paper has looked at the country’s various external 
vulnerabilities that might prevent it from carrying out its mandate. The new government is in a 
relatively good position to choose policies that could accelerate growth and provide the economic 
basis for improved living standards, such as a proposed expansion of access to water for households 
and for agriculture. The new hydrocarbons law has significantly improved the fiscal situation of the 
government for the foreseeable future, and is likely to provide even more revenue in the coming 
years. As such, although there is opposition from foreign companies and interests, it would seem 
that this is one reform that may be vital to the new government’s avowed goals. 
Although the government does depend on some foreign financing for its operations, this 
dependence has been diminishing as the fiscal situation has improved and should fall considerably as 
the World Bank and IDB debt – accounting for about three-quarters of the country’s external public 
debt – are cancelled. With regard to this future debt cancellation, loans, or grants, it would seem 
extremely difficult as a political matter for Bolivia to be singled out and treated differently from 
other countries in the same category, e.g. HIPC countries in Latin America. The same is true for 
trade preferences. Although Bolivia is likely to continue to lose access to concessional lending 
because it is growing beyond the IDA low-income category, its need for such lending will also 
decrease as the fiscal situation improves and the economy grows. The IMF has not expressed any 
opposition to the new government’s policies, other than its opposition to the hyrdrocarbons law, 
which was enacted under the previous government. But since the Fund has cancelled Bolivia’s debt, 
and the IMF’s role as “gatekeeper” for international loans and grants is currently in question, it is 
not clear that Bolivia will face any significant pressure from these quarters either. 
One thing that the new government could do, as a precautionary and transitional measure, is to 
apply for a line of credit with the Venezuelan government. As noted above, Venezuela’s lending 
from its surplus foreign exchange reserves to Argentina and Ecuador has been a very important 
source of financing for those countries, and will almost certainly be available to Bolivia should it 
become necessary. But by opening a line of credit in advance – one that it is not expected to draw 
upon in the foreseeable future – Bolivia can significantly reduce some risks of financial instability. 
For example, this pre-approved credit would reduce the risk of the kinds of runs on deposits that 
the country experienced in 2002 and 2004, as depositors would know that the country has access to 
an additional supply of foreign exchange reserves. This is especially important in an economy that 
remains as dollarized as Bolivia’s. 
A line of credit with Venezuela would also insulate Bolivia against any unanticipated reductions in 
external lending or grants, and help smooth the country’s transition to non-concessional and 
domestic borrowing, while reducing the need for the country’s own accumulation of reserves and 
therefore reducing pressure on the current account. It would also discourage foreign creditors and 
donors from trying to exert undue influence or attach unwanted conditions to their loans, debt 
cancellation, or grants, as they would know that Bolivia has another source of foreign exchange.  
Another move that could improve the Bolivian government’s fiscal situation in the immediate future 
as well as for many years, would be to reverse the privatization of the country’s public pension 
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system. As noted above, and also by the IMF,
35 this privatization has created very large, long-term 
transition costs, as the income from current taxes is not available to pay current retirees. By 
switching back to a “pay-as-you-go” system as the United States has, the government’s fiscal deficit 
could be substantially reduced. Any revamped public system would of course have to be actuarially 
sound and ensure that future promised benefits were fundable according to plausible economic and 
demographic assumptions. But the potential deficit reduction from switching back to a traditional 
public-defined benefit system is large enough that this option is definitely worth considering. 
                                                 
35 See e.g. IMF 2005a, pp.17-18. 
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